Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance by Taslitz, Andrew E.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 49 | Issue 4 Article 8
1-1998
Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert
Relevance
Andrew E. Taslitz
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 Hastings L.J. 1039 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol49/iss4/8





Some scholars and judges have declared war on environmental
hardship defenses, often derisively labeling them "abuse excuses."
These are defenses in which counsel argues that some oppressive
condition in a criminal defendant's social environment must be un-
derstood in order for the finder of fact to comprehend the defen-
dant's mental state. Social environment can be raised in any context
where the defendant's mental state is relevant: insanity, self-defense,
diminished capacity, duress, and extreme emotional disturbance.
Some environmental hardship defenses have previously been quite
successful, some not.' Examples include battered woman syndrome,
black rage, cultural evidence, urban psychosis, and television intoxi-
cation
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1. See, e.g., PAUL HARRIS, BLACK RAGE CONFRONTS THE LAW 5-8, 129-31, 198-
201 (1997) (defining "environmental hardship" defenses while explaining media and judi-
cial hostility toward at least one such defense, "black rage"); JODY DAVID ARMOUR,
NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN
AMERICA 90-91 (1997) (describing the "unwarranted panic that determinist approaches
to human behavior strike in the heart of traditional criminal scholars," as illustrated by
their reaction to Richard Delgado's proposed "coercive persuasion" defense); Abbe
Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young Men: Reflections
of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 443-44
(1994) (describing judicial attitude toward evidence of rotten social background: "Al-
lowing a Social Scientist to testify in a criminal case is worse than allowing a mental
health professional to testify; in the judge's view, at least mental health professionals
draw on their own experience with patients.").
2. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 446-47.
3. See sources cited supra note 1; Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal De-
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Some courts have flatly declared expert testimony on environ-
mental hardship irrelevant.' One judge, after regretting his decision
to admit such testimony, instructed the jury to ignore the testimony
as irrelevant. The conviction was affirmed on appeal. One commen-
tator summarized the appellate court's reasoning on the irrelevancy
claim as follows: "[T]he court's role is limited and ... it cannot be
concerned with broad issues of justice."'
Today the relevancy of expert testimony about environmental
hardship will often be decided under the now familiar "relevancy and
reliability" test of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 for
fense Based Upon the Toxicity of Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxi-
cation, and Black Rage, 74 N.C. L. REV. 731 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 3 (collection of cases); HARRIS, supra note 1, at 129-31,
198-202 (same); 31A AM. JUR. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 195 (1989) (citing cases
holding that expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome is inadmissible):
Cynthia L. Coffee, Note, A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony Concerning the Battered Woman Syndrome, 25 J. FAM. L. 373, 390, 392-93
(1986-87) (summarizing states' reasons for rejecting expert testimony concerning battered
woman syndrome); Kimberly M. Coop, Note, Black Rage: The Illegitimacy of a Criminal
Defense, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 205 (1995) (arguing that black rage expert testimony is
insufficiently relevant to justify its admissibility). But see Judd F. Sneirson, Comment.
Black Rage and the Criminal Law: A Principled Approach to a Polarized Debate, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 2251, 2263-88 (1995) (conceding relevancy of black rage experts in insanity
defense cases but arguing for limitation on the use of such experts on policy grounds).
5. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 130. The case Harris discussed was United States v.
Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972). as amended
(D.C. Cir. 1973). In Alexander, the defense psychiatrist testified that the defendant was
delusional, "preoccupied with the unfair treatment of Negroes in this country and the idea
that racial war was inevitable." Id. at 957. He testified at length about the defendant's
upbringing as a cause of the delusions. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 127. In his closing argu-
ment in support of an insanity defense, defense counsel relied on the defendant's difficult
childhood environment or "rotten social background." Id. at 128. After closing argu-
ments, however, the trial judge "became agitated and refused to allow the jury to consider
the social and economic environment of the defendant." Id. at 129. See also 471 F.2d at
968 (McGowan, J., dissenting) ("[The trial judge's instructions] remind the jury that the
issue before them for decision is not one of the shortcomings of society generally ... ").
Environmental hardship defenses have also been challenged as based on a divi-
sive notion of group identity, undermining individual responsibility, and embodying "junk
science." See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE
THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997); ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE
(1995). The first two of these challenges are essentially claims that the evidence is irrele-
vant under Rule 401, or of such low probative value as to be unhelpful to the jury under
Rule 702. See WILSON, supra, at 107-08 ("The most valuable approach to expert testi-
mony, however, is for the trial judge to greet with skepticism any claim that social science
can tell a jury much about why something happened. Very little such testimony tells the
jury much that it does not know from common experience.").
6. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). I am assuming for the purposes of this essay that some
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admitting scientific evidence. Unfortunately, the Court had little to
say about what "relevance" is other than that it includes "fit."7 "Fit"
simply means that just because a technique's scientific validity is
shown for one purpose does not mean that it is valid for other, unre-
lated purposes.
Whatever the Daubert "relevance" inquiry means, however, we
can assume that by choosing this term the Court sought to root its
meaning at least partly in familiar evidentiary definitions of rele-
vance. These definitions would include Rule 401's logical relevancy
concept-defining "relevant" evidence as making a fact of conse-
quence to determining an action more or less probable than it would
be without that evidence 8-and Rule 403 pragmatic relevancy, re-
quiring the exclusion of logically relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by countervailing considerations
Both concepts would sweep more broadly in expert evidence cases
than is encompassed in the notion of "fit."' I and some courts and
commentators thus assume that Daubert's "relevancy" criterion is
more than a requirement of fitness.1"
variation of Daubert applies to social sciences, including to the environmental hardship
defenses, and not merely to the natural sciences. See, e.g., Edward Imwinkelried, Evi-
dence Law Visits Jurassic Park The Far-reaching Implications of the Daubert Court's
Recognition of the Uncertainty of the Scientific Enterprise, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE
118 (1997) ("[T]here is a strong argument that like testimony based on hard science, so-
cial and mental health science testimony must pass muster under Daubert's validation
test.")
7. 509 U.S. at 591.
8. FED. R. EVID. 401.
9. FED. R. EVID. 403.
10. For a thorough comparison between the meanings of "relevance" in Rule 401,
and "probative value" in Rule 403, see David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence,
34 HouS. L. REV. 1 (1997). For an insightful analysis of the meaning of "probative
value" and the practical operation of Rule 403 in light of recent United States Supreme
Court case law, see Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 After United States v. Old Chief,
20 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 563 (1997).
11. For example, on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Daubert said this:
The Supreme Court recognized that the "fit" requirement "goes primarily to
relevance,".., but it obviously did not intend the second prong of Rule 702 to
be merely a reiteration of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 402. In
elucidating the "fit" requirement, the Supreme Court noted that scientific expert
testimony carries special dangers to the fact-finding process because it "'can be
both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it."'
Federal judges must therefore exclude proffered scientific evidence under Rules
702 and 403 unless they are convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an is-
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I hope to shed light on what "relevancy" means beyond simply
"fit" in the context of environmental hardship cases, though I will
briefly return to "fit." I will make two broad, admittedly somewhat
speculative points, to illustrate that the "relevancy" inquiry may be
every bit as rich as the reliability inquiry.
First, much relevancy scholarship and case law is based on the
tradition of "atomistic rationalism." This tradition generally assumes
that: (1) there are truths waiting to be discovered by rational inquiry;
(2) this judgment of rationality requires "atomistic" analysis of how
individual items of evidence interrelate to promote probative value;
(3) this analysis requires the identification of linear chains of rea-
soning; and (4) there is a dichotomy between reason and emotion.
Atomistic rationalists operate in an institutional environment in
which trial judges view themselves as apolitical arbiters of the cases
before them, and distrust broader social inquiries. To the atomistic
rationalist, much expert testimony about environmental hardship
seems more prejudicial than probative, for it draws the jury into the
politicized arena of social conflicts well beyond the criminal case, ap-
pealing to emotions ("sympathy") rather than rationality.
An alternative developing tradition is that of holism, which
stresses that a mass of trial evidence can be persuasive in a way that
analysis of individual items of evidence cannot. Much of what per-
suades cannot therefore easily be articulated in terms of deductive or
inductive logical relationships among pieces of evidence.
I argue for one variant of holism, storytelling theory. Storytel-
ling theorists reject the reason/emotion dichotomy, recognizing that
certain "rational emotions" are central to public judgment. Storytel-
ling theorists also appreciate that we are social creatures, for narra-
tives turn on conflicts and connections among individuals and groups.
Storytelling theorists thus embrace "dialogic" over linear thinking,
recognizing that what does and should persuade can be a function of
messy, complex, contradictory thoughts and feelings that escape lin-
ear description. To the storytelling theorist, much environmental
hardship evidence thus seems relevant, for it explores the social, hu-
man side of defendants' lives; builds the tools for the jury to see al-
ternative plausible tales; and encourages jurors to feel the kind of de-
tached empathy-the standing in another person's shoes-necessary
to judging mental state.
sue in dispute in the case, and that it will not mislead the jury.
43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995).
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The second broad point I want to make flows from the first:
judges, like jurors, engage in dialogic reasoning. Consequently,
judges' relevancy rulings reflect their worldviews, emotional predilec-
tions, and other often unconscious cognitive processes. Yet one's
worldview often reflects one's group affiliations and social position.
A judge who is unaware that these factors are at work may consis-
tently undervalue a subordinate group's relevancy arguments because
they flow from an alternative worldview. Evidentiary rulings that
consistently promote verdicts disadvantaging an oppressed group
contribute to that oppression. Relevancy judgments are thus politi-
cally charged, reflecting two types of political power-"epistemic"
and "social" power-which I define later. I therefore urge judges in
environmental hardship cases, which routinely involve the claims of
subordinate groups, to explore the political implications of their deci-
sions.
In defending these two ideas, I do not suggest that environ-
mental hardship evidence should therefore necessarily be admitted in
particular cases. Rather, I seek only to illustrate how "relevance"
can be a question of values, politics, language, and diverse experi-
ence, a question worthy of far more attention than it gets.
These speculations are best understood in the context of a hypo-
thetical, to which I will return in each part of this essay. The hypo-
thetical involves a man named John Cheng.
I. The John Cheng Hypothetical
John Cheng is a graduate student in philosophy who killed the
members of his doctoral thesis committee.12 Cheng claims that he
was insane, or at least extremely emotionally disturbed, at the time of
the crime.
Cheng emigrated from Hong Kong a few years ago. He came
from an upper middle-class family there, but his family severed all
12. This hypothetical is based on linguists' research into linguistic domination and
accent discrimination, as summarized in ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN
ACCENT: LANGUAGE, IDEOLOGY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1997). Claims of accent discrimination causing mental illness and distress have been
raised in civil rights suits for money damages under Title VII. See id. at 152-70. So far as
I know, however, extending these arguments to insanity, as in the Cheng hypothetical, is a
novel claim. That is precisely why I selected it. I offer such a detailed hypothetical in the
hope that the details themselves help to illustrate some of the points that I want to make:
that environmental hardship experts can promote empathy, and that relevancy decisions
are partly political judgments.
Apr. 1998]
ties when Cheng refused to join the family business.
Cheng had been an outstanding and privileged student in Hong
Kong. But in the United States, he met one disappointment after an-
other. For years, he was unable to get a teaching assistantship
("TA") or office job, finding work only as a bus boy in a Chinese res-
taurant. When he finally did get a TA position, he got such poor
teaching evaluations that his contract was not renewed. His grades
were barely passing. He blamed all this on discrimination based on
his accent and race, for he was confident that he otherwise had a
strong command of English and a talented mind. The rejection of his
dissertation was the final straw, and he reacted with violence.
His defense attorney raised a novel defense: linguistic rage.
Linguistic rage is rooted in sociolinguistic studies of accent. The
studies view "accent" as often not a physical bar to understanding,
but an outcome of a social categorization process by which outsider
groups are subordinated. Professor Mar Matsuda has described this
process as follows:
When... parties are in a relationship of domination, we tend to say
that the dominant is normal, and the subordinate is different from
normal. And so it is with accent .... People in power are per-
ceived as speaking normal, unaccented English. Any speech that is
different from that constructed norm is called an accent.
The defense plans to call a linguist to the stand who will testify
that this ideology of linguistic subordination is widespread. Accent
discrimination thus systematically excludes talented workers from
jobs, promotions, and other kinds of recognition for achievement.
Yet, after childhood, many adults are physiologically incapable of
losing their accents. Moreover, accents are generally not a bar to un-
derstanding by those willing to listen. Furthermore, our ways of
speaking are central to our social and individual identities, so failed
efforts to lose our accents and the resulting ridicule cause great emo-
tional pain.
Additionally, accent and race discrimination are linked. While
some Asian-Americans have now achieved visible success in Ameri-
can society, Asian accents activate the worst stereotypes about
Asians. In short, "accent, when it acts in part as a marker of race.
takes on special significance.""
The defense also plans to call a psychologist who will testify that,
13. Mari Matsuda, Voice of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Juris-
prudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1361(1991).
14. LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 11, at 228.
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as a result of accent discrimination, Cheng suffered from a mental
disease or defect, thereby losing the ability to tell right from wrong or
to control his impulses, two tests for legal insanity; Cheng also suf-
fered an extreme emotional disturbance, thereby justifying the miti-
gation of murder to manslaughter.
The prosecution objects on relevancy grounds, arguing first, that
the linguist adds nothing of value to the psychologist's opinion that
Cheng was insane; and, second, that Cheng, not society, is on trial, so
social injustices such as accent discrimination do not matter. The
prosecutor is wrong on both counts because of the linguist's power to
promote "dialogic thinking."
H. Holism and Dialogic Thinking
A. Atomistic Rationalism
Evidence scholarship has long been characterized by a rationalist
tradition."5 This tradition assumes that there are truths "out there"
that we can accurately discover through the rational weighing of rele-
vant evidence by neutral factfinders. 6 Rationalists assume sharp di-
chotomies between fact and value and fact and law.' They see the
primary goal of evidence law as maximizing accuracy in fact determi-
nation. 8 Other criteria, such as speed, cheapness, procedural fair-
ness, humaneness, public confidence, and the avoidance of vexing the
participants may also be taken into account. 9 The primary role of fo-
rensic psychology and forensic science is to offer guidance about the
reliability of different types of evidence and the methods for in-
15. WILLIAM TWINING, RETHINKING EVIDENCE: EXPLORATORY ESSAYS 71-82 (1990).
16. See id. at 72-74. "Rationality" is, however, an aspiration, existing practices and rules
often being criticized for their perceived irrationality. See id. at 75.
17. See id. at 75.
18. "The pursuit of truth (i.e., seeking to maximize accuracy in fact-determination) is to
be given a high, but not necessarily an overriding, priority in relation to other values, such as
the security of the state, the protection of family relationships or the curbing of coercive meth-
ods of interrogation." Id. I nevertheless describe the rationalist position as viewing truth as
'primary" because establishing the truth about past events in a particular case is considered a
"necessary condition for achieving justice in adjudication." Id. Despite the rhetoric about
truth, some have argued that in practice our system often assigns truth a relatively low value, at
least in comparison to the solemn judicial statements to the contrary. See MIRJAN DAM]sKA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 120-24 (1997). Dama~ka suggests, however, that we assign truth a
higher value in criminal than in civil cases. See id.
19. See TWINING, supra note 15, at 73.
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creasing such reliability.20
Historically, most rationalists were "atomists," that is, arguments
about evidence concerned a logical analysis of the relations between
or among individual items of evidence.1 Wigmore's Chart Method
perhaps took atomism to its highest form. This method involves
carefully outlining, then charting, how each item of evidence in a case
logically relates to other items in promoting conclusions.2
Atomistic rationalism is usually characterized by linear reason-
ing. Scholars in this tradition speak of "chains of inferences," each
item of evidence leading by a series of inductions or deductions to a
particular conclusion.23 While these conclusions are admittedly not
certain ones-they involve probability judgments-these scholars see
it as both possible and meaningful to combine probability judgments
in reasoning chains.24
Many atomistic rationalist scholars tend as well to view eviden-
tiary analysis as an exercise in formal or informal logic or mathemat-
ics, or at least view evidence as involving a "science of judicial
proof."'2 Such analyses are either devoid of discussions of emotion,
or emotion is viewed as something to fear, a source of juror "preju-
dice:" "[T]he harm of unfair prejudice is commonly understood to
arise from emotionally charged evidence. A facile dichotomy be-
tween cognitive and emotive qualities developed in response to that
understanding.
26
Atomistic rationalists are uncomfortable with ambiguity. That
discomfort may explain their frequent affinity for the deceptive clar-
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 239 ("The [chart] method is in essence an elaborate and vigorous form of
rational reconstruction (or construction) of arguments in a manner which involves articulating
every step of an argument and mapping the relations between all the parts."). Wigmore also
articulated a "narrative method," but he saw it as a sloppy version of atomistic charting rather
than a different, more holistic sort of analysis. See id. at 239-42.
23. See id. at 240-41. Twining discusses the relative contributions of inductive and de-
ductive reasoning to rationalist inquiry in TERENCE ANDERSON & WILLIAM TWINING,
ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE: HOW TO Do THINGS WITH FACTS BASED ON WIGMORE'S SCIENCE
OF JUDICIAL PROOF 63-69 (1991).
24. See TWINING, supra note 15, at 73, 240-41.
25. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, and Meta-
Relevance, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 55 (1997) (analyzing relevance in terms of Bayes' Theorem).
See generally JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF, AS GIVEN BY
LOGIC, PSYCHOLOGY AND GENERAL EXPERIENCE (3d ed. 1937, sub nom. THE SCIENCE OF
JUDICIAL PROOF).
26. Louis A. Jacobs, Evidence Rule 403 After United States v. Old Chief, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 563, 581 (1997).
[Vol. 491046
EXPERT RELEVANCE
ity of diagrammatic or mathematical representations of evidentiary
reasoning.27 Their belief in a pre-existing objective truth also leads
them on a quest for a more certain path to that truth.' Thus their
scholarship and judicial opinions focus on ways to improve that quest.
They debate the likelihood that DNA correctly identifies the perpe-
trator, that psychologists correctly diagnose insanity, and that lie de-
tectors uncover deception. 9 But each of these inquiries is assumed to
have a "right" answer, although one may have trouble in determining
that answer in a particular case.
Atomistic rationalists also operate in an institutional environ-
ment in which judges see themselves as apolitical umpires seeking to
resolve the narrow dispute before them.Y Judges are reluctant to
broaden evidentiary inquiries much beyond the narrow time and
place of the incident.3 Overburdened courts pressed to move cases
in assembly line justice are also hesitant to consume judicial time
with events temporally or geographically remote from the incident. 2
Each of these aspects of atomistic rationalism has increasingly pome
under attack. Atomism has been challenged by "holism," the idea
that we must consider the mass of trial evidence as a whole and assess
its plausibility in a manner that defies analysis of the individual as-
sessment of each evidentiary item's probative value.33 A variant on
holism stresses that there are many "rational" bases for our decisions
27. See sources cited supra note 25.
28. See TWINING, supra note 15, at 73-76 (noting that the dominant tone of rationalist
scholarship is optimistic, reflecting a belief that the prospects for improving our search for truth
about past events are good).
29. See, e.g., 1 DAvIDL. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 222-86, 554-747 (1997) (summarizing legal and scien-
tific status of DNA testing, polygraph analysis, and psychological diagnoses relevant to insan-
ity.)
30. See, e.g., RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER TALES OF
APOCALYPTIC AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 29 (1996) ("Law disag-
gregates and atomizes, even though many grievances have a group dimension. This leaves the
litigant lonely and without allies. It encourages him or her to think about his own grievance,
not those of the group."). See infra text accompanying notes 98-102 (on judicial distrust of
"generalized knowledge").
31. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice Through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1993) [hereinafter Taslitz, Myself Alone] (ex-
plaining that institutional forces push courts toward "shallow" case logic); ARMOUR, supra note
1, at 82, 84 (conservative courts and prosecutors seek to narrow the evidentiary time frame to
the criminal incident; exclude evidence about social, cultural, and economic conditions; and
render the defendant's personal history and attributes irrelevant).
32. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 31, at 18-20.
33. See TwINING, supra note 15, at 241.
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that we cannot easily articulate in a systematic manner:34
For our own part, we are inclined to believe that the effort to state
systematically and comprehensively the premises on which our in-
ferences rest may produce serious distortions in the factfinding pro-
cess, in part (but only in part) because such systemic statement ob-
scures the complex mental processes that we actually employ and
should employ to evaluate evidence. It is not true that we can say
all we know, and the effort to say more than we are able to say is
likely to diminish our knowledge and the ability to use it. In our
daily lives, we confidently rely on innumerable premises and beliefs
that we often cannot articulate or explain, but our inability to ex-
press these premises and beliefs does not necessarily make them il-
legitimate or unreliable. The same may be true of many beliefs re-
lied upon in the assessment of evidence by a trier of fact in the
courtroom.S
One type of holistic analysis making its way into both evidence
scholarship and case law views the trial as an effort to craft a mean-
ingful human narrative. Narrative analysis can better capture how
the normally inarticulate aspects of our reasoning can persuade, as
Gerald Lopez shows:
While debate over what the facts mean (argument) is encouraged
to be more explicitly persuasive than debate over what the facts are
(storytelling), argument as an act of persuasion is constrained in
most cultures in a way that storytelling is not ... stories by their
very nature can appeal to what is, by convention, still taboo in a
culture. Because facts themselves capture and reflect values, what
cannot be argued explicitly can be sneaked into a story. Indeed,
the genius of story-telling as an act of persuasion is that it buries ar-
guments in the facts. Stories can thereby circumvent the existing
constraints on the meaning that can be given to the facts as found.
Put differently, relevance is for a story a much looser standard than
it is for argument. 37
While Lopez views narrative as "sneaking in" factors the law
sees as illegitimate, many other narrative analysts argue that em-
bracing narrative is more descriptively accurate and normatively de-
sirable than atomistic rationalism.3" Jurors will craft plausible stories
whether we admit to this reality or not. The question is the degree to
34. See id.
35. 1A WIGMOREON EVIDENCE § 37, at 986 (Tillers rev. 1983).
36. See TWINING, supra note 15, at 239-47. Twining apparently views "holism" and
"narrative" as distinct theories, but since narrative seeks to explain the meaning and impact of a
mass of evidence--one definition of holism--I see the two theories as really variants on the
same theme.
37. Gerald Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REv. 1, 32-33 (1984).
38. See, e.g., NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE
LAW 63-78 (1995) (describing research concluding that jurors reason in narrative fashion); see
also Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 31, at 94-98.
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which we will see that their storytelling is informed or is based on
mere speculation.39 These storytelling theorists view much of human
reality as inherently narrative in nature.40 Mental state in particular is
a matter of plausible interpretation, rather than a single truth waiting
to be discovered.41 While storytelling may involve us in a complex
form of reasoning that is hard to articulate, we can identify for scru-
tiny the bases of story-based judgments.42 Identifying those bases
may, however, involve us in inquiries akin to literary criticism, classi-
cal rhetorical argumentation, or historical analysis. 3 Logic and tradi-
tional notions of science continue to play a role, but they are not all
that trials are about.'
Good stories, of course, must have emotional appeal. Storytel-
ling theorists and their sympathizers see this not as a criticism but, to
the contrary, as a description of good reasoning: "The most persua-
sive evidence the advocate can offer combines cognitive and emo-
tional qualities," and "evidence may legitimately have emotional
39. See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 31, at 91-100 (on improving jurors' storytel-
ling); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 436-37 (1996) [hereinafter Taslitz, Patriarchal Sto-
ries] (summarizing experimental data on jurors filling story gaps with their own speculations
where the evidence needed to craft a plausible tale is incomplete).
40. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 39, at 434 ("Stories thus control our un-
derstanding, both of our social world and our sense of personal identity.").
41. William Twining argues that holistic and storytelling theories are at least "open to in-
terpretation as non-sceptical, cognitivist theories that treat the enterprise as one of enquiring
about the correspondence of some version of events with a notionally external reality."
TWINING, supra note 15, at 242. He implies, however, by his cautious language, that storytel-
ling theories are also "open to interpretation" as favoring an interpretive, socially constructed
definition of reality. I have argued for a middle ground: that storytelling theory is consistent
with a realist epistemology for some "facts" but not others. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist
Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming
1998) [hereinafter Taslitz, Feminist Approach] (manuscript at 1-83, on file with author). Spe-
cifically, I have argued that mental state determination, in particular, involves the crafting of a
plausible interpretive story. See id.
42. See Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 39, at 439-71 (using social science and the
products of high and popular culture to identify themes in cultural and courtroom rape narra-
tives).
43. See id. (using a combination of such inquiries to understand rape trials); see also Tas-
litz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41 (manuscript at 8-11) (analogizing admissibility questions
on social scientific evidence to historical inquiry).
44. Twining correctly points out that atomism, holism, and storytelling theory all share a
commitment to internal consistency, compatibility with uncontested or established facts, and
coherence with society's general stock of knowledge as ways to gauge the credibility of a theory
or story. See TWINING, supra note 15, at 242. Consequently, he concludes that "both narra-
tive and explicit argument are almost bound to have a place in any prescriptive theory about
arguing towards, arriving at, justifying and evaluating adjudicative decisions on disputed ques-
tions of fact." Id.
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force, and emotional evidence can be consistent with reasoned delib-
eration."4"
Storytelling theorists thus reject the univocal reasoning of ato-
mistic rationalists in favor of more dialogic thinking.
B. Dialogic Thinking
(1) Defining Terms
Although we generally think of dialogue as involving two or
more people, the usage of this word has more recently been extended
to exchanges of voices or viewpoints within a single mind . Indeed, I
have argued elsewhere that reasoning is best understood as a self-
conversation, an internal dialogue. Such dialogue often requires
one to hold many sometimes contradictory thoughts and emotions at
once." For a jury to understand another's mental state, therefore, the
jury must be able to engage in "dialogic thinking." Dialogic thinking
enables a jury to see many perspectives at once, an essential ability in
making the complex, value-based, interpretive assessment of mental
state.9
Dialogic thinking has two essential qualities. First, such thinking
involves reciprocity, the give and take between aspects of the same
mind. Second, dialogic thinking involves strangeness, the shock of
new information, such as from divergent opinion, unpredictable data,
and sudden emotion. These two qualities promote an evolutionary
process by which world views are slowly changed."
Arguably, our culture, and particularly our legal system, seeks to
promote linear, monologic thinking. Life is presented as a series of
single choices among limited alternatives. We feel weak or ashamed
if we express uncertainty, anxiety, or confusion about the complexity
of things. We instead value forthrightness, consistency, coherence.
and integrity.'
45. Jacobs, supra note 10, at 578-79.
46. See ROBERT GRUDIN, ON DIALOGUE ix, 5 (1996).
47. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41 (manuscript at 26-44).
48. See, e.g., GRUDIN, supra note 46, at 36.
49. See id. (defining "dialogic thinking"); Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41.
at 6-15 (explaining why mental state determination is an interpretive endeavor).
50. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, at 12 (defining essential qualities
and significance of dialogic thought).
51. Id. at 15-20 (describing the linear, monologic nature of our culture); see also
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA
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Yet insights from a wide range of sources, from psychology to
philosophy to history, suggest that this is all an illusion. "Socially and
politically, we inhabit a world of unspoken premises, hidden dangers,
subtle contradictions, and quiet intractabilities . .,52 It is only in the
multiplicity of these voices that we come to understand life's issues
and each other.
Although our culture generally discourages conscious awareness
of dialogic thinking, such thinking is expressed in some of our basic
vocabulary. Thus we recognize paradoxes, such as that life is both
meaningful and pointless, or that actions are both freely-willed and
determined. We use double-entendres to shock others out of their
senses of linguistic complacency (that each word has only one mean-
ing) and moral complacency (that social relationships will proceed in
a polite, business-as-usual form). We wrestle with irony as a way of
confronting us with a pair of contradictory realities. And we rely on
ambiguity to remind us of "the different voices-asserting, com-
plaining, accusing, seducing, haunting-that can speak in a single
soul."53 These linguistic tricks used to encourage dialogic thinking
enable us to understand one another's reality in a way we otherwise
would not.
(2) Metaphor
Perhaps the most important familiar example of dialogic think-
ing is metaphor. The essence of metaphor is understanding and ex-
periencing one thing in terms of another. A metaphor is thus an at-
tribute of thought and not simply a linguistic expression. But
metaphorical expressions can activate culturally-embedded meta-
phors that speak to us with great emotional power. Metaphors and
metaphorical expressions reach us in multiple emotional and intellec-
tual ways, "resituat[ing] our experiences in ambiguity, multiplicity,
uncertainty, and contradiction." Metaphors can thus challenge us to
AND RACE 10-15 (1995) (critiquing Western culture's obsession with linear thinking).
52. GRUDIN, supra note 46, at 19-20 (summarizing the bases of the theory of dialogic
thinking).
53. Id. at 26.
54. Bruce A. Arrigo, Rethinking the Language of Law, Justice, and Community:
Postmodern Feminist Jurisprudence, in RADICAL PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO MAINSTREAM LEGAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 88,
100-1 (David S. Caudill & Steven J. Gould eds., 1995). The classic analysis of the meta-
phorical nature of our thinking is GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE
LIVE BY (1980). For an analysis of the implications of recent research on metaphor for
evidentiary reasoning, see Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 39, at 424-29.
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rework our ideas of social reality.
In the Cheng hypothetical, jurors are likely to view the case
through the metaphors of "criminal as hunter and society as prey," or
"criminal as filth." Both are common metaphors by which our soci-
ety views criminals, metaphors likely to have stronger emotional ap-
peal because they are buttressed by our similar views of immigrants
as either scavengers or garbage. 5 None of these metaphors promote
the kind of empathy necessary for understanding another's mental
state.
The linguist's testimony can help jurors simultaneously to acti-
vate an alternative culturally-salient metaphor: "society as bully, de-
fendant as victim. 5 6 Under this metaphor, society is seen as brutal-
izing a far weaker opponent, denying him jobs, money, respect,
success, based on an irrelevant characteristic-his accent-over
which he had no control. He may have overreacted, killing rather
than finding a less drastic way to defend himself. But because he was
wrongly victimized by a bully, Cheng deserves some measure of com-
passion. Indeed, whether to mitigate murder to manslaughter ulti-
mately involves precisely the question of whether Cheng deserves the
compassion that requires reducing his culpability and punishment.57
55. See RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: IMAGES AND
REALITIES 49 (2d ed. 1998) ("In the mass entertainment media vision of society, evil and
cunning predator criminal wolves create general mayhem and prey on weak. defense-
less-and often stupid-victim sheep (women, the elderly, the general public) .... '):
MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS, 119-87 (1996)
(tracing the metaphor of the "criminal as filth" and as an "excrementitious mass" in
Western culture). See also Peter Schuck, Review Essay of PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN
NATION (1993) (describing Brimelow's book as based on a view of immigrants as akin to
parasites, garbage, or scavengers): Linda S. Bosniak, Opposing Prop. 187: Undocumented
Immigrants and the National Imagination, 28 CONN. L. REV. 555 (1996) (summarizing
American national views of immigrants as unworthy): Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olviados:
Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and En-
forcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1993); accord Gerald R. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws:
Government Services, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1425. 1428-29 (1995) (analyzing images of immigrants as alien invaders
from outer space).
56. Cf Taslitz. Patriarchal Stories, supra note 39, at 448-53 (discussing the "bully"
metaphor's role in rape cases).
57. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 496-98. 503-04
(1995): Paul Savoy, The Spiritual Nature of Equality: Natural Principles of Constitutional
Law, 28 How. L.J. 89, 821-23. n.45 (1985) ("Thus when the firm, in the form of the strict
letter of the law.... meets with the yielding in the form of compassion, murder is reduced
to manslaughter."); Alan Reed, Duress and Provocation as Excuses to Murder: Salutary
Lessons from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 51. 70
(1996) ("The origins of the provocation [reducing murder to manslaughter] are ancient
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A second relevant pair of metaphors are the "strict father" ver-
sus the "nurturant parent." Some cognitive theorists have argued
that these competing metaphors guide most Americans' political and
moral judgments,58 and a criminal trial is ultimately a moral/political
event.
59
The "strict father" model posits a traditional nuclear family in
which the father has the responsibility for setting and enforcing strict
rules of behaviorf Children must respect and obey parents, and love
and nurturance can never outweigh parental authority.' Under this
view, a criminal like Cheng has disobeyed "society as father" and
must be punished. No further inquiry is necessary.
Under the "nurturant parent" model, children's obedience
comes from love and respect for their parents. Good communication
is key. What children need to learn most to live a fulfilling life is em-
pathy for others and the maintenance of social ties." Strength and
self-discipline are viewed as key parts of empathy, social connection,
and community responsibility. Parents teach these things by example
and by respecting the child's uniqueness.' Under this metaphor, so-
ciety must empathize with Cheng and understand his place in the so-
cial web before he can be judged. The linguist's testimony is there-
fore very relevant.
The point here is that some metaphors are always at work, for
we cannot help but think metaphorically. Yet no metaphors are
"natural," though the ones under which we traditionally operate may
seem so to us. Rather, the metaphors we choose are a function of
cultural conditioning, life experience, and value choices.6 Under one
metaphor-the "strict parent"-the linguist's testimony seems irrele-
and predicated on a concession to human frailty."); Gerald A. Williams, Note, Criminal
Law: Tully v. State of Oklahoma: Oklahoma Recognizes Duress as a Defense for Felony-
Murder, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 515, 527 (1988) ("If duress reduces murder to manslaughter,
then the killing would be condemned but compassion would be shown in the sentenc-
ing.").
58. See GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS 11-37 (1996) (defining "strict father"
and "nurturant parent" metaphors and their role in political judgment).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 71-114 (explaining political nature of jury tri-
als).
60. LAKOFF, supra note 58, at 65-71.
61. Id. at 66.
62. See id. at 109-10.
63. See id. at 108-13.
64. On the subconscious power of metaphor, see LAKOFF, supra note 58, at 3-37;
Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories, supra note 39, at 404-10, 424-29 (linking ideology and meta-
phor).
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vant, while the opposite is true under the "nurturant parent" meta-
phor. Which metaphor we choose is a value judgment. If we wish to
promote the kind of empathic detachment that Adam Smith and
Martha Nussbaum call "judicious spectatorship," which I have else-
where argued a sound justice system requires," then we should
choose the "nurturant parent." At the very least, we should make
room for both metaphors to promote the dialogic thought necessary
for determining mental state.
(3) Rational Emotions and Copia
My repeated reference to empathy underscores another aspect
of my views on relevance: emotions can be quite relevant to factual
inquiry. Some emotional appeals are, of course, illegitimate, but tra-
ditional evidentiary jurisprudence treats all emotions as inappropri-
ate.6 Again, that approach ignores the insights of cognitive psychol-
ogy. Research in that field demonstrates that the reason/emotion
dichotomy is false. Emotion often plays some role in our reasoning.
Emotions identify what matters to us and permit us to assign values
to what we perceive and do. The emotionless person is an irrational
person. Furthermore, emotions are a central part of our moral and
social judgments. A justice system devoid of emotion is soon one de-
void of the common man's respect.6 7
65. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41 (manuscript at 63-69) (explaining
Smith and Nussbaum's views and how they shed light on just evidentiary policy): accord
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE 53-78 (1995) (explaining why the "judicious spectator" is a good model for jury deci-
sionmaking); ADAM SMITH. THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 1.1.4.6 (1774)
(defining 'judicious spectator").
66. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5215, at 230 (Supp. 1996) (denouncing "the
misguided attempt to equate 'prejudice' with 'emotion' and the sloppy intellectual analy-
sis that usually accompanies this.").
67. On the link between emotion and reason, see ANTONIO R. DAMASIO.
DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994). On the im-
plications of this insight for expert evidence law, see Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra
note 41, at 21-30. For an argument that recent United States Supreme Court case law and
some recent scholarship have come to recognize the importance of emotion to legal, espe-
cially evidentiary. reasoning-with particular emphasis on empathy-see Jacobs. supra
note 10, at 577-82. One recent philosopher of science rejects entirely, however, the con-
cept of "emotions" as a unitary concept. See PAUL E. GRIFFITHS, WHAT EMOTIONS
REALLY ARE (1997). This philosopher divides "emotion" into three distinct categories
based upon empirical research. First, there are emotions, such as a brief flaring up of an-
ger in response to some immediate experience, that are evolutionarily ancient, reflex-like
responses that appear unmediated by culture. Id. at 77-78, 83. Second, there are higher
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Only the most extreme kind of dialogic thinking-"copia"-can
promote one kind of emotion, empathy, that is central to a fair crimi-
nal trial. "Copia" was originally a classical rhetorical term used by
Roman writers like Cicero and Quintilian "to describe a special vir-
tue of great literature: its enthralling, overwhelming richness
in... detail [and] variation."' But the term "copia" can be extended
to describe a way of seeing things, of simultaneously viewing an ob-
ject of study from every possible angle. To view a person copiously is
to understand how he could simultaneously be annoyed, relieved,
anxious, worried, ashamed, angry, alarmed, and guilty.69  But where
action is required, such multiple ways of understanding need not lead
to paralysis. To the contrary, copious thinking can lead to a new con-
viction:
To appreciate a subject from every possible perspective, to make a
tour of the interpretive means, is to touch the subject, to walk into
it, as one might walk into a house that one has seen only from the
outside before. To think copiously about a tree is... to
know.., the abundance of things that trees mean to people. To
understand this is to see that for all its variety, copious thinking is
often more empowering than it is destabilizing, for when we are in
touch with the heart of things, with their human whatness, we can
speak and act from the heart ourselves."
Juries may think copiously about matters that judges do not,
thus seeing a relevance that judges miss. For example, the law in in-
sanity cases frequently seeks to promote linear reasoning, focused on
cognitive emotions, like moral guilt, that differ importantly across cultures, and combine
biological, cultural, and experiential factors. See id. at 100-01, 104, 118, 120-21, 132-36.
Third, there are emotions that appear to be the acting out of today's psychological myths,
social constructions in the sense that they are either reinforced by culture or pretenses
that mimic other emotions. See i& at 137-67. The value of this trichotomy is that it dem-
onstrates that what we commonly call "emotions" differ in the degree to which they are
comprised of cognitive and cultural, as opposed to biological, components. Moreover,
each of the three types of emotions have different evolutionarily adaptive functions and
play different psychological roles. See id- at 228-47. This emotion trichotomy therefore
lends support to my argument that there are "rational" emotions that should properly
play a role in factfinding and "irrational" emotions that should not. See Talitz, Feminist
Approach, supra note 41, at 21-28. Of course, labeling an "emotion" as "rational" for
factfinding purposes is not only an empirical or philosophical question but also a political
and policy question about what role we want particular emotions to play in our public life.
68. GRUDIN, supra note 46, at 35; CICERO, DE ORATORE, XXX.xxxi 125;
QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIONS ORATORIAE, Book X. See also TERENCE CAVE, THE
CoRNUcoPIAN TEXT (1979) (on literary copia in the Renaissance).
69. See, e.g., GRUDIN, supra note 46, at 36,46-47.
70. Id. at 49.
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a defendant's state of mind at a single moment." Experimental data
show that jurors in insanity defense cases fail, however, to channel
their reasoning along the lines of judicial instructions, regardless of
what legal insanity test is used. Rather, the majority of jurors apply
their own intuitive constructs of "sanity" versus "insanity." Those
constructs are primarily twofold. First, in order to render a defen-
dant responsible for his actions, jurors make a moral judgment about
whether the defendant was sufficiently able to behave differently
than he did. Second, if he did not have the capacity to change his be-
havior, jurors ask this question: to what extent did the defendant, by
his own culpable behavior before the crime, help to cause his own
mental incapacity? Jurors thus deem it highly relevant to learn of the
broader personal and social context that led to the crime, to view the
criminal act in its full moral complexity.72 Jurors will think copiously
about these matters whether we give them complete information or
not.
Rather than permitting jurors to speculate wildly, we should give
them the information they see as important. The precise point of the
linguist's testimony in Cheng's case is to show that society is at least
partly to blame for Cheng's incapacities. That point is one that
judges, like most jurors, should consider "relevant."
111. The Politics of Relevance
This final section explores the role of politics in the relevancy
determination. In traditional evidentiary thinking, politics has no
proper role in factfinding. Political considerations would taint our
quest for a single, objective truth. 3
Inez Garcia's trial judge at her first trial summed up the tradi-
71. See, e.g., 21 AM. JUR. 2d CRIMINAL LAW § 52 (1981) (noting that the inquiry in
an insanity defense case "must be directed to the defendant's capacity at the time the act
was committed" (emphasis added)). I am not arguing here for a change in this legal stan-
dard for insanity, which focuses on the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime.
Rather, I am arguing that jurors cannot, often will not, and certainly should not make the
judgment whether a defendant was insane at the time of the crime without information
about events long before the criminal act.
72. See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE
LAW 286-97 (1995) (summarizing research on jurors' notions of insanity). Finkel goes on
to note that "this capacity-responsibility judgment is common to situations that have little
to do with insanity per se, indicating that this culpability judgment is commonplace and
widespread." Id.
73. See Robert P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence
Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461 (1996) (rebutting in some respects the traditional view).
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tional view well. Garcia had killed her rapist out of fear of further
abuse. She sought, in raising a psychiatric defense, to focus on rape
and how society's failures to protect women from rape and to convict
their assailants leaves women few options other than violence. The
judge barred most evidence relevant to, her defense as irrelevant.
"We are not trying a cause," the judge said, "we are trying a woman,
Mrs. Garcia, and I am not going to make this courtroom a forum for
a cause."
74
The criminal courtroom, I will argue, is often a forum for a
cause, whether we want it to be or not. Every decision admitting or
excluding evidence has political consequences.75 This section begins
by explaining in general terms why relevancy judgments are political.
The section then elaborates on this explanation by defining and illus-
trating two types of evidentiary political power: epistemic power and
social power.
A. Why Relevance is Political
That relevancy judgments are political is suggested by the work
of cognitive language theorists. These theorists recognize that lay-
men's notions of relevancy vary based on each layman's social con-
text. One man's relevance is another man's waste of time. Rele-
vancy judgments are thus not purely logical but reflect our deepest
moral, political, religious, and cultural assumptions.76 Feminist the-
ory suggests similar conclusions:
Feminist legal scholars reject the assertion that the concept of rele-
vance is simply a matter of logic, unaffected by the substantive law
or the perspective of the individual judge .... A model of individ-
ual will is assumed, in which individual decisions may be affected by
circumstances in the particular case, such as constraints from the
'bad motivations of other individuals,' but which does not recognize
74. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 198-99 (discussing Garcia's case and quoting the trial
judge).
75. To observe that politics always plays a role is not to concede that this is always a
good thing. I have argued elsewhere that epistemic and social power are clearly norma-
tively desirable considerations only when determining mental state in criminal cases. See
Talitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, at 120-27. For other issues, the normative de-
sirability of politics' playing a role is more dicey. Yet, even when we think that politics
should not play a role, we must be aware of its operation to reduce its impact. Here I use
some examples that arguably do not involve the mental state inquiry. My ultimate point,
however, is that to the extent that an argument can be crafted that such cases should in-
volve political analysis, the argument is far stronger when determining mental state.
76. See DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE: COMMUNICATION AND
COGNITION 1-28, 108-18, 136-47, 145-49, 155-63 (2d ed. 1995).
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constraints imposed by history, socialization, class, race or gender.77
Cognitive language theorists also view relevancy as an economic
judgment: Is the cognitive cost of computing probative value (what
the language theorists call "contextual effects") worth the perceived
likely benefit? Again, this is a value-laden judgment. Yet we are
generally not consciously aware of the thinking processes underlying
our relevancy judgments. Consequently, we may view as simple logic
what is in fact a particular manifestation of our cultural and political
biases.78
Evidence law sometimes implicitly recognizes this last insight,
viewing relevancy conceptions as "a subjective matter, dependent on
the individual observer's own personal assessments., 79 The law re-
sponds with a conception of how the "reasonable person" would per-
ceive the probabilities.' But critical legal scholarship has shown that
the "reasonable person" is a value-laden construct, often used to
mask policy choices and exercises of political power.' A judge not
fully aware of these realities may simply view as "common sense" his
judgment that an item of evidence is irrelevant. Where controversial
matters like racism, sexism, and the like are involved, as with envi-
ronmental hardship defenses, "common sense" may simply reflect ig-
norance or subconscious cognitive biases. 2 A judge should make a
more careful, candid, searching inquiry.
At the very least, the judge should consider that the differing
epistemic visions of different impacted groups may result in different
relevancy judgments. For example, in the O.J. Simpson case many
blacks and whites differed-having a different "common sense" of
the degree of probative value, if any, to give to evidence of prior
wife-beating by Simpson and of police abuses. 3 The judge should
also, as with many "reasonableness" inquiries, determine the social
impact of labeling one view of relevance "reasonable," and others
77. Marilyn MacCrimmon, The Social Construction of Reality and the Rules of Evidence,
in DONNA MARTINSON ET AL., A FORUM ON LAVALLEE V. R.: WOMEN AND SELF-DEFENSE,
25 U.B.C. L. REV. 36, 39-40 (1991).
78. See SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 76, at 1-28, 108-18, 136-47, 145-49, 155-63.
79. Richard D. Friedman, Irrelevance, Minimal Relevance, and Meta-Relevance, 34
Hous. L. REV. 55, 61 (1997).
80. Id. at 61-63.
81. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
763-65 (1994) (summarizing feminist scholarship denouncing the "reasonable man" standard in
the law of self defense).
82. See, e.g., ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 115-41.
83. See generally Andrew E. Taslitz, An African-American Sense of Fact: The O.J. Trial
and Black Judges on Justice 7 B.U. PUB. INT'L. L.J. 1 (forthcoming 1998).
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not." Candor about the political implications of the seemingly "logi-
cal" relevancy judgment is therefore key, something that Inez Gar-
cia's first trial judge did not understand.
The political implications of relevancy judgments are better il-
lustrated by examining two types of political power: "epistemic" and
''social" power.
B. Epistemic Power
Epistemic power arises from judges and jurors bringing precon-
ceptions and cognitive schemes to their taskY Those preconceptions
and schemes are rooted in cultural stories and class, race, and gender-
based experience." Consequently, members of different groups often
share particular visions of reality." But visions that prevail with any
consistency benefit one group-channeling social resources, like
physical freedom, money, and other kinds of power to it-often at
another group's expense.8 When one group's world vision so pre-
vails, that group has "epistemic power."' 9 Evidence rules thus create
epistemic power both because they affect which social visions of re-
ality prevail and who benefits thereby.9°
We can shed light on epistemic power by comparing two com-
mon situations discussed in progressive law students' views of first
year Criminal Law.
The first situation involves a battered woman shooting her
sleeping husband. The second, a variation on the infamous Bernhard
Goetz case, involves a subway vigilante shooting a black teenager
who asks the vigilante for a dollar while the two ride a subway car.
The vigilante had been mugged and beaten once before by a black
male teenager. This mugging, says the vigilante, taught him to fear
black males.9'
Both woman and vigilante claim self-defense. The woman prof-
fers a battered woman syndrome expert, the man a "reasonable rac-
84. See infra text accompanying notes 101-105.
85. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, at 120-27 (also more fully defending
the concept of epistemic power, but in a context other than relevancy).
86. See id. at 120-21.
87. Id. at 120.
88. Id. at 121.
89. See id. at 120-27.
90. See id. at 120-27 (defining "epistemic power").
91. For details about the Bernhard Goetz case, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME
OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETz AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988).
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ist" expert.92 Who should prevail? Progressive law students say the
woman but not the vigilante.
Mark Kelman suggests two possible epistemic justifications for
the students' views. First, students may believe that the woman's
perception of her own danger was more accurate than the vigilante's.
Second, adopting a "hyperskeptical multiculturalism," the students
believe that we can never know "truth." At best, we know only what
passes for truth in a particular subculture. We need to educate juries
about the subcultural positions of battered women but not of domi-
nant white men."
(1) The Hyperskeptic
The hyperskeptical position suffers from the potential flaw
that it provides no clear ground for favoring the woman over the
man. There are, says Kelman, "subcultures in which the battered
woman's descriptive visions and normative pleas resonate and sub-
cultures in which the subway killer's do."9 One possible way to re-
solve this problem is to give those groups a say who have the weakest
political voices. Even realists can agree that this makes sense,
on the ground that truth cannot emerge unless different people
with different perspectives are allowed to speak. That is what the
jury system is supposed to be all about; it also undergirds the sys-
tem of checks and balances. The basic idea may well point toward
efforts to reform existing institutions-but precisely in the name of
truth.
9
But Kelman sees a more overtly political justification for ampli-
fying group voices, even in a hyperskeptical world. He writes:
[T]he essential political task is to insure that each subculture's voice
is adequately heard. Thus, in the context of legislatures, we might
see multiculturalists demand corporatist, proportional representa-
tion schemes. In the context of jury trials, the context we are most
concerned with here, the notion would presumably be that the sub-
way killer will get an adequately sympathetic hearing without the
aid of expert testimony or cautionary instructions, while the bat-
92. The hypotheticals described here are variations, changed to stress the expert evi-
dence issues, of those articulated in Mark Kelman, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonable-
ness, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE: PROOF, PRACTICE, AND PERSUASION ACROSS THE
DISCIPLINES 169-88 (James Chandler et al. eds., 1994). On the notion of the "reasonable
racist," see ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 19-34.
93. Kelman, supra note 92, at 169-77.
94. Id. at 177.
95. Cass Sunstein, On Finding Facts, in QUESTIONS OF EVIDENCE, supra note 92. at
192 (commenting on Kelman's essay).
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tered woman's claims will be unduly discounted and marginalized
unless we make special efforts to bolster them. There may be no
ultimately objective view of risk determined by evidence; given,
though, that a political body (the jury) exists with the power to
validate certain views, it must be manipulated to treat each inevita-
bly partial understanding as equally weighty.9
Kelman's insight has profound practical consequences, for if
hearing battered women's voices leads to acquittals and funnels more
resources to studying and correcting the problem of battering, then
battered women as a group gain power. The trial is thus inevitably
another site at which group visions contend for epistemic dominance
as part of the struggle for power.'
(2) The Realist
Switching again from a hyperskeptical to a realist epistemology
allows us to examine the progressive students' first justification for
treating the battered woman and the vigilante differently: that the
woman's assessment of danger is more accurate. This judgment, says
Kelman, reflects our legal system's strong preference for "local" over
"general" knowledge. "Local" knowledge is the knowledge of par-
ticulars, of persons, places and things in the particular case. "Gen-
eral" knowledge is of patterns and probabilities in individual, group,
and social behavior.98
The battered woman knows her husband well, having felt his
blows, having learned the meaning of a twitch of his lip or a glint in
his eye. That is local knowledge. The subway vigilante, by contrast,
does not know his victim but relies primarily on generalized, racist
stereotypes.
Is it so clear, however, that we always can or should privilege lo-
cal over general knowledge? From the subway vigilante's perspec-
tive, he has much local knowledge. He has been mugged on the sub-
way himself, has spoken to other victims, has seen others mugged.
He has learned from these direct observations of danger. He trusts
this knowledge.
On the other hand, the battered woman's local knowledge may
be flawed. In the early period of battering, she may underestimate
the danger, for she does not want to think ill of one she loves.
Moreover, some battered woman syndrome theorists apparently con-
96. Kelman, supra note 92, at 178.
97. See also ARMOUR, supra note 1, at 81 (making a similar point).
98. See Kelman, supra note 92, at 183-88.
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cede that the woman's estimates of the danger that she faced were
wrong, though understandable."
Other battering theorists see the battered woman as hyperra-
tional, as having an understanding of danger that the rest of us cannot
comprehend." ° For these theorists, we must understand the entire
system of patriarchal oppression of women through violence in order
to appreciate the danger that this woman was in. Only then can we
realize that her fears were justified. Yet the study of patriarchal op-
pression is a form of generalized knowledge.
By comparison, these same theorists would likely reject the
vigilante's claim to general knowledge-that black teenagers are
dangerous-as empirically wrong and morally unacceptable.""
Moreover, we cannot reason without using a great deal of gener-
alized knowledge. 2 Sometimes local knowledge may be better
sometimes general, most often both. Yet we continue to hold an
aversion to generalized knowledge in fact-finding, an aversion that
may explain the resistance to environmental hardship defenses.
Those defenses by definition rely on testimony about general social
conditions.
Our legal system's aversion to the role of generalized knowledge
in factfinding is an exercise of "epistemic power." Proof processes
that focus solely on local knowledge divert attention from underlying
social issues. If we care only about whether Sally killed her abusive
husband, John, we need not explore the patriarchal underpinnings of
a social system that too often condones violence against women. If.
on the other hand, we do explore that social system, we may see that
Sally is not fully responsible for her actions. Her actions are partly
determined by an unjust set of societal institutions. But if the limita-
tions created by an unjust society are exposed, pressure is created for
social change. Such change would shift resources, affecting the dis-
tribution of freedom, money, education, self-respect, and raw power
99. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, at 77-81 (describing critiques of
battered woman syndrome as "pathologizing" women).
100. See id.
101. These analyses of local versus generalized knowledge are largely drawn from
Kelman, supra note 92, again with some of my own modifications. I am not sure that I
agree with Kelman that our legal system consistently undervalues generalized knowledge,
though it clearly does so often. But I assume the accuracy of his assertion for the pur-
poses of illustration in this essay. Kelman does not explore the political implications of
his assertion in quite the way that I do.
102. See ANDERSON & TWINING, supra note 23, at 66-67 ("Background generaliza-
tions provide the basis for these and most, if not all, inferences.").
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among groups. Evidentiary rules that discount generalized knowl-
edge as irrelevant therefore favor the status quo. The dominant
group's vision of reality prevails, maintaining that group's power.
C. Social Power
The battered woman-subway vigilante hypothetical also demon-
strates the concept of "social power." Social power arises because
every factual judgment contains a risk of error. But the same size risk
should be weighed differently depending upon the consequences of a
mistake. Social power asks what the consequences of such a mistake
are for society as a whole rather than for any group or individual. 3
Assume, for example, that the exclusion of battered woman syn-
drome and reasonable racist syndrome leads to erroneous acquittals
20 percent of the time each. We might perceive very different conse-
quences for society of acquittals in the two types of cases. Acquitting
the subway killer sends the message that black males are entitled to
less physical safety than whites. But blacks, in turn, might limit the
places that they go and the things that they do to avoid assault. This
is particularly reprehensible because of a history of discrimination
and physical abuse of blacks. While blacks as a group are harmed,
therefore, so is society. A society that condones creating separate so-
cial castes is less caring, denying the value of equal respect for all
human beings. Moreover, greater inequality breeds resentment and
poverty, in turn leading to greater social tension and crime. Fur-
thermore, we simply cannot know with confidence what the teenagers
would have done if the vigilante had not shot. The teens may be per-
fectly innocent, or merely rude or unruly. Permitting the wounding
of teens not proven to have committed a wrong to go unpunished
breeds general disrespect for the law."°
103. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, at 47-50 (defining "social power").
104. Kelman makes some of these points, but his emphasis is different. He stresses
the risk of the vigilante or the woman being in error about the physical danger they each
faced from their perceived assailants; that is, he focuses on "reasonableness" as concern-
ing the accuracy of a defendant's beliefs about the physical world. See Kelman, supra
note 92, at 183-88. I stress the risk of the jury being in error about either the defendant's
mental state (that is, whether the defendant had the alleged belief in the first place) or its
reasonableness. See Cynthia Kwi Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (explaining that self-defense
requires judgments that a suspect had the relevant mental state and that both it and the
suspect's actions were reasonable). Moreover, unlike Kelman, I view reasonableness as a
normative question that turns on more than the accuracy of the defendants' beliefs that
they were in danger. For example, the degree of choice available to a defendant, given
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The consequences of acquitting the battered woman are argua-
bly far less. We know that she was indeed battered. Her husband
was not innocent. We therefore regret errors less. Moreover, al-
though any error suggests a failing of the justice system, that failing
should not be perceived as buttressing a domination system. To the
contrary, the verdict will likely be received as reflecting community
compassion for a woman who may have over-reacted in the face of
intense suffering. Erroneous acquittal of the wife does not, therefore,
raise any social concerns different from those in a wrongful acquittal
of any other killer. But social power expands our awareness of the
political consequences of evidence law to include unequal respect,
shattered relationships, blocked catharsis, reduced caring, indeed any
social costs associated with evidence law. We should take those so-
cial costs into account in crafting rules governing whether to permit
expert testimony in the battered woman and subway vigilante cases.
D. John Cheng and the Politics of Relevance
These two concepts of evidentiary politics help to elucidate the
John Cheng hypothetical. Cheng's novel claim seems implausible at
first, a claim manufactured to free an obviously guilty man. How
could simply having an accent drive a man so over the edge as to ren-
der him legally insane? This claim does not fit dominant narratives.
But a fuller understanding of the system of linguistic domination
portrays a very different social vision. That vision is one in which
language and race combine systematically to exclude, denigrate, and
oppress the innocent. Moreover, the method of domination-accent
discrimination-is particularly cruel, striking at the heart of our sense
of self-identity. In this vision, Cheng's acts can better be understood
as more determined than willed, therefore more insane than sane.105
Furthermore, ignoring this alternative vision hides the robbing
of bright, talented immigrants' futures by their unfair exclusion from
jobs and income. To hold the "linguistic rage" expert's testimony ir-
relevant is an exercise of epistemic power, embracing the status quo
and worldview of the dominant group.
Such an embrace also has broader social implications, condoning
her perceived life circumstances, is relevant to reasonableness. In any event, either Kel-
man's emphasis or mine raises many very similar "social power" concerns, although I
think that my emphasis creates a more defensible argument for taking politics into ac-
count in crafting evidentiary rules.
105. See generally LIPPI-GREEN, supra note 12.
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precisely the kind of social caste system that "reasonable racist" sub-
way vigilantes help to promote.1°6 Immigrants become true second
class citizens, exposing as a lie the American promises of equal op-
portunity and denying our economy the most productive use avail-
able of its resident alien labor. 1w It would be an appropriate exercise
of social power to reduce these costs by permitting Cheng to tell his
tale.
Finally, Cheng has a stronger political claim than either the
vigilante or the battered woman. The latter two defendants made
claims partly about the physical world: that they were about to be as-
saulted. Cheng seeks only to prove his mental state. Mental states,
as noted earlier, do not exist "out there" but are interpretive acts.
There is no single, universally true answer to the question, "What was
Cheng's mental state?" Therefore, we should give multiple plausible
answers to that question a fair hearing.
Conclusion
This essay has sought to illustrate that the relevance of expert
testimony is not a simple matter of logic. Rather, relevancy determi-
nations reflect cultural and political biases. If lawyers are more alert
to those biases, they may be more effective in conveying to judges al-
ternate ways to view evidence as relevant.'O
106. See Sunstein, supra note 95, at 189-96 (on the caste-system and the subway vigi-
lante).
107. See sources cited supra note 55 (discussing treatment of immigrants in America);
RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DISTANT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN
AMERICANS (1989) (tracing the ways in which society has long denied Asian-Americans
equal opportunity).
108. Critical legal and other scholars have long argued for expanding doctrinal argu-
ments made to courts to include overtly political judgments. See, e.g., John Fellas, Recon-
structing Law's Empire, 73 B.U. L. REv. 715, 716 (1993); David Luban, Difference Made
Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152, 2153 (1989); John C. Williams,
Critical Legal Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62
N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 432 (1987). But the critical theorists' approach need not be followed
for lawyers to make practical use of the insights offered here. First, explaining how emo-
tions matter or the differences between "local" and "general" knowledge can fit within
standard arguments that "relevant" matters are those that alter the probabilities of a fact
of consequence. Second, pointing out unsupported preconceptions underlying a ruling of
irrelevancy may move a judge to change his mind. Third, to the extent that relevancy is
viewed as a matter of degree, as is expressly true under Rule 403, balancing necessarily
invites a weighing of a wide-ranging set of considerations, a policy judgment about what
evidence is really important and why. Political arguments, even if couched in terms of
alerting the court to previously unarticulated assumptions that may "prejudice" the
court's analysis, may have some impact on how a judge weighs the balance. Finally, even
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Moreover, judges should view as relevant evidence that appeals
to certain rational emotions and that helps jurors engage in the kind
of dialogic thinking central to fair judgment. Images of ideal jurors
as cold, logical calculators are both inaccurate and unjust.'" Indeed,
the United States Supreme Court seems recently to have recognized
this insight in Old Chief v. United States." There, Old Chief was
charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1). The prosecutor refused to stipulate that Old
Chief had a prior felony conviction. The trial court thereafter denied
Old Chief's motion to limit testimony about his prior conviction to
the information offered in his stipulation. The name and nature of
his prior conviction, for assault causing serious bodily injury, were re-
vealed at trial, and Old Chief was convicted on all counts. The Ninth
Circuit, on appeal, found no abuse of the trial judge's discretion, but
the Supreme Court disagreed, reversing that judgment.
In doing so, however, the Court stressed that evidence may be
probative simply because it aids the telling of a "colorful story with
descriptive richness.'"" Moreover, evidence may address many ele-
ments at once, having "force beyond any linear scheme of reason-
ing,"1 2 because of the special "persuasive power of the concrete and
particular."1 3 This persuasive power, the Court noted, is partly due
to the evidence's emotional appeal:
When a juror's duty does seem hard, the evidentiary account of
what a defendant has thought and done can accomplish what no set
of abstract statements ever could, not just to prove a fact, but to es-
tablish its human significance, and so to implicate the law's moral
if the arguments made here are not expressly made to courts, awareness of conceptual
and political constraints on courts' concepts of "relevance" should help lawyers in strate-
gizing about what traditional arguments are likely to appeal to a court and the likelihood
of their success.
109. I am not suggesting that the law behaves as if we believe jurors are coolly logical.
To the contrary, the law fears that they are emotional and irrational. My disagreement is
that the law strives to move jurors toward a kind of cold logic that is neither attainable
nor desirable. See supra text accompanying notes 46-72.
110. 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997).
111. Id. at 653.
112. Id. By "non-linear" reasoning, the Court was addressing how an item of evi-
dence may simultaneously tend to prove multiple elements of a crime rather than, as in
this essay, tending to demonstrate multiple aspects of a single element such as mental
state. Nevertheless, the Court's language shows a sensitivity to the idea of multiplicity-
many truths in a single item of evidence-over linearity. Moreover, the Court stressed




underpinnings and a juror's obligation to sit in judgment .
What this essay has sought to argue in part is precisely that some
evidence matters because it establishes the "human significance" of
facts and implicates the law's "moral underpinnings." While these
considerations ultimately did not prevail on the facts before the
Court in Old Chief, the Court has suggested that it will be receptive
to appeals to "non-linear reasoning schemes" and rational emotions
in appropriate cases. This essay has sought to sensitize lawyers and
scholars to the need to take that invitation seriously.
In this conclusion I also want to suggest one final lesson: our
relevancy instincts and teachings may affect how we think about reli-
ability. If we favor linear forms of reasoning and insist on a realist
conception of mental states-one in which there. is a single, objective
answer "out there" to the question, "What is the defendant's mental
state?"-we promote linear, realist conceptions of science. In par-
ticular, we will be receptive to notions like Karl Popper's which limit
"science" to testable statements. Furthermore, we tend toward a
monolithic view of science as meaning only the cool logic of Pop-
perian thinking. Anything else seems of little relevance.' s Yet we
sense, as did the Daubert Court, a link between relevance and reli-
ability. Completely unreliable theories have little, if any, chance of
making facts of consequence more or less likely and are, therefore,
not relevant. Correspondingly, if we start with the belief that evi-
dence is either unconnected to the issues before us or unlikely to al-
ter their probability, it is hard to see them as trustworthy.
A broader conception of relevance recognizes that mental state
determination is not a realist endeavor but an interpretive act. Such
an act requires empathy, understanding in an emotionally powerful
way the defendant's life story. But empathy requires multiplicity
rather than linearity, knowing and feeling the many truths simultane-
ously present in a single human life. Non-Popperian interpretive so-
cial science, such as is practiced by many linguists, psychologists, and
sociologists, can sometimes more effectively convey this multiplicity
in a way that science modeled on the laboratory cannot.11 6 John
Cheng's thoughts and feelings cannot come to life in a laboratory, a
survey, or a regression analysis. But his world can come to life in the
114. Id. at 653-54.
115. For an analysis of expert evidence law's obsession with universalist, realist, Pop-
perian notions of evidence law, see Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 41, (manuscript
at 3-12, 20-25, 45-47) and sources cited therein.
i5. See ida at 113-18.
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story of historical white domination of Asian immigrants and the sys-
tematic abuse wrought by accent prejudice and racial abuse. If we
see that story as relevant, we will be far more open to judging its reli-
ability fairly.
This last point relates squarely to Daubert's notion of "fit." Re-
member that "fit" reminds us that scientific validity for one purpose
does not mean validity for other, unrelated purposes.' 7 But our
"relevancy" conceptions affect the purposes for which we believe
evidence is being offered. If we see promoting rational emotions like
empathy, encouraging dialogic thinking, and giving group visions po-
litical voice as legitimate, relevant uses of expert testimony, our no-
tion of "fit" changes. While an interpretive social scientist may be
poor at predicting an individual instance of human behavior, he may
be very good at powerfully conveying what life is like for Asian im-
migrants. For that purpose, his testimony might be quite valid, thus
"fitting" quite well. Because "fit" links relevance to scientific valid-
ity, that is, evidentiary "reliability," we can see how our relevancy
conceptions may mold our reliability notions as well. In applying
Daubert, therefore, we must be much more alert to how our own
cognitive and political biases affect whether we deem expert testi-
mony "relevant and reliable."
117. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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